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Abstract
For vertex cover games (introduced by Deng et al., Math. Oper. Res., 24:751-766, 1999
[2]), we investigate population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont, Games
Econ. Behav., 2: 378-394, 1990 [11]). We show that the existence of a population monotonic
allocation scheme (PMAS for short) for vertex cover games can be determined efficiently and
that a PMAS, if exists, can be constructed accordingly. We also show that integral PMAS-es for
vertex cover games can be characterized with stable matchings and be enumerated by employing
Gale-Shapley algorithm (introduced by Gale and Shapley, Amer. Math. Monthly, 69:9-15, 1962
[4]).
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1 Introduction
Cooperative game theory lays out a theoretical framework for analyzing cooperation among inde-
pendent participants. An essential issue in a cooperative game is to find an adequate allocation
to distribute the expected cost of the coalition to individual participants. There are many criteria
for evaluating how “good” an allocation is, such as fairness, stability, and so on. Emphases on
different criteria lead to different solution concepts, e.g., the core, the Shapley value, the nucleolus,
the bargaining set, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. Among those solution concepts,
the core which addresses the issue of stability is one of the most attractive solution concepts.
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Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (201713051, 201964006).
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The core in a cooperative game is the set of allocations for the grand coalition (i.e., the coalition
of all participants), under which no participant can derive a better payoff by leaving the grand
coalition, either individually or as a subgroup. However, an allocation that lies in the core does not
necessarily guarantee the unhindered formation of a coalition, as the cost allocated to participants
in the current coalition may increase when a new participant joins in.
To study allocations in an expanding coalition, population monotonic allocation schemes (also
known as cross-monotonic cost-sharing schemes) were introduced, under which no participant of
any coalition derives a worse payoff after a new participant joins in. A PMAS gives no incentive
to any participant to block the expansion of coalition and hence the grand coalition is always
achieved. Besides, PMAS-es shift the attention from allocations only for the grand coalition to
allocation schemes, which deal with partial cooperation and provide allocations for any coalition.
Moreover, the set of allocations for the grand coalition that can be reached through a PMAS can
be seen as a refinement of the core: the core provides allocations in a sense of static stability, while
PMAS-es provide allocations in a sense of dynamic stability.
Populations monotonic allocation schemes were first studied by Sprumont [11], where some
characterizations on PMAS-es were provided. In particular, Sprumont proved that submodularity
is sufficient for existence of a PMAS. Grahn and Voorneveld [5] showed that every bankruptcy game
admits a PMAS by indicating bankruptcy rules that give rise to a PMAS. Norde et al. [8] presented
a combinatorial algorithm for computing PMAS-es in minimum cost spanning tree games. Hamers
et al. [7] characterized the class of coloring games admitting a PMAS and provided an algorithm
enumerating all integral PMAS-es. Motivated by the work of Hamers et al. [7], we investigate
PMAS-es for vertex cover games by generalizing the characterization of submodular vertex cover
games [9]. Our results are in the same spirit as the work of Hamers et al. [7], and are also inspired
by the work of Chen et al. [1]. We provide an efficient characterization for the class of vertex
cover games admitting a PMAS and show that integral PMAS-es can be characterized with stable
matchings and be enumerated by employing Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Vertex cover games studied in this paper fall into the scope of combinatorial optimization games
[2, 3], which arise from cost allocations in the minimum vertex cover problem. Vertex cover games
were first studied by Deng et al. [2], where the algorithmic aspect of the core was investigated
and a complete characterization for the balancedness of vertex cover games was presented. In a
following work [3], Deng et al. gave a necessary and sufficient condition for the total balancedness
of vertex cover games. As opposed to the model of Deng et al. [2, 3] where players are edges, Gusev
[6] introduced a different class of vertex cover games where players are vertices, and investigated
the application to transport networks. In this paper, we stick to the vertex cover game introduced
by Deng et al. [2] and investigate PMAS-es.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section introducing
the relevant concepts of game theory and graph theory. In Section 3, an efficient characterization
for the class of vertex cover games admitting a PMAS is presented. Section 4 offers a dual-based
description of PMAS-es for vertex cover games. In Section 5, we characterize and enumerate
integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games with stable matchings. Section 6 concludes the results in
this paper and addresses some complexity issues in computing PMAS-es.
2 Preliminaries
This section first reviews some concepts from game theory and graph theory, and then introduces
the definition and some known results for vertex cover games.
2.1 Cooperative game theory
A cooperative game is a tuple Γ = (N, γ), where N is the set of players and γ : 2N → R is the
characteristic function with the convention γ(∅) = 0. Any subset S of N is called a coalition, where
N is called the grand coalition. For coalition S, γ(S) represents the total cost charged to S. A
cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) is said monotonic if γ(S) ≤ γ(T ) for any S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊆ T . A
cooperative game Γ = (N, γ) is said submodular if the characteristic function γ is submodular, i.e.,
γ(S) +γ(T ) ≥ γ(S ∪T ) +γ(S ∩T ) for any S, T ∈ 2N . The subgame of Γ corresponding to coalition
T , denoted by ΓT , is a game (T, γT ) with γT (S) = γ(S) for any S ⊆ T .
A cost allocation of Γ = (N, γ) is a vector a = (ai)i∈N , which consists of proposed costs to be
paid by players in the grand coalition. A cost allocation a is said efficient if
∑
i∈N ai = γ(N), and
said group rational if
∑
i∈S ai ≤ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N . In particular, a is said individual rational if
ai ≤ γ({i}) for any i ∈ N . An imputation of Γ is a cost allocation that is efficient and individual
rational. The core of Γ, denoted by C(Γ), is the set of imputations that are group rational. A core
allocation is a cost allocation in the core, which satisfies all players in the grand coalition and no
player has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition. A game Γ is said balanced if C(Γ) 6= ∅
and total balanced if C(ΓT ) 6= ∅ for any nonempty T ⊆ N .
A population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS for short) of Γ = (N, γ) is a vector a =
(aS,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S satisfying the following two conditions:
– efficiency :
∑
i∈S aS,i = γ(S) for any S ∈ 2N\{∅};
– monotonicity : aS,i ≥ aT,i for any S, T ∈ 2N\{∅} with S ⊆ T and any i ∈ S.
Let P(Γ) be the set of PMAS-es for Γ. When P(Γ) 6= ∅, Γ is said population monotonic (also known
as cross-monotonic). Let a = (aS,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S be a PMAS for Γ. For any S ∈ 2N\{∅}, denote by
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aS = (aS,i)i∈S the restriction of a to S, which is a core allocation of subgame ΓS . Notice that even
total balancedness is not sufficient for the population monotonicity, as a PMAS provides for every
coalition a core allocation in a cross-monotonic way. Hamers et al. [7] proved that PMAS-es of
monotonic cooperative games are always nonnegative. We refer to [11] for more about PMAS-es.
Lemma 1 (Hamers et al. [7]). Let a be a PMAS for a monotonic cooperative game Γ = (N, γ).
Then aS,i ≥ 0 for any S ∈ 2N\{∅} and any i ∈ S.
2.2 Graph theory
Throughout, a graph is always finite, undirected and simple. Let n ∈ N. We use Kn to denote the
complete graph with n vertices, use Cn to denote the graph which is a cycle with n vertices, and
use Pn to denote the graph which is a path with n vertices. Let H be a graph. We use V (H) to
denote the vertex set of H and use E(H) to denote the edge set of H. A graph is said H-free if
it contains no subgraph isomorphic to H. A graph is bipartite if it is odd-cycle-free. A graph is a
forest if it is cycle-free. A forest is a tree if it is connected. A vertex is pendant if it has degree
one. An edge is pendant if it is incident to a pendant vertex.
Let G = (V,E) be a graph. The distance of two vertices u and v in G is the minimum number
of edges in a path connecting them. The diameter of G is the largest distance between any two
vertices in G. For any S ⊆ E, G[S] denotes the edge-induced subgraph of G, VS denotes the vertex
set of G[S], and δS(v) denotes the set of edges incident to v in G[S]. A vertex cover of G is a
vertex set C ⊆ V such that each edge of G intersects C. The vertex cover number of G, denoted by
τ(G), is the minimum size of vertex covers in G. A matching of G is an edge set M ⊆ E without
common vertices. The matching number of G, denoted by ν(G), is the maximum size of matchings
in G. Clearly, ν(G) ≤ τ(G), since every vertex in a vertex cover only covers at most one edge in a
matching. It is well known that equality ν(G) = τ(G) holds when G is bipartite [10].
2.3 Vertex cover games
A vertex cover game has players on edges and the game value is defined by the vertex cover number.
Formally, the vertex cover game on a graph G = (V,E) is a cooperative game ΓG = (N, γ), where
N = E and γ(S) = τ(G[S]) for any S ⊆ N .
Lemma 2. Every vertex cover game is monotonic.
Proof. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G. Let S ⊆ T ⊆ N . Notice that every
vertex cover of G[T ] is also a vertex cover of G[S]. It follows that γ(S) ≤ γ(T ).
Lemma 3 (Deng et al. [2]). The vertex cover game ΓG on a graph G is balanced if and only if
ν(G) = τ(G).
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Lemma 4 (Deng et al. [3]). The vertex cover game ΓG on a graph G is totally balanced if and
only if G is bipartite.
Lemma 5 (Okamoto [9]). The vertex cover game ΓG on a graph G is submodular if and only if G
is (K3, P4)-free.
3 An efficient characterization for population monotonicity
In this section, we show that a graph induces a vertex cover game admitting PMAS-es if and only
if the graph is (K3, C4, P5)-free. We decompose our proof into several lemmas.
Figure 1: Forbidden subgraphs
Lemma 6. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G. If P(ΓG) 6= ∅, then G is
(K3, C4, P5)-free.
Proof. Let a ∈ P(ΓG). We show that any of K3, C4 and P5 yields a contradiction.
We first consider K3. Suppose E(K3) = {1, 2, 3}. Note that γ({1, 2, 3}) = 2 and γ({1, 2}) =
γ({2, 3}) = γ({1, 3} = 1. By efficiency and monotonicity, we have
4 = γ({1, 2, 3}) + γ({1, 2, 3})
= a{1,2,3},1 + a{1,2,3},2 + a{1,2,3},3 + a{1,2,3},1 + a{1,2,3},2 + a{1,2,3},3
≤ a{1,2},1 + a{1,2},2 + a{2,3},3 + a{1,3},1 + a{2,3},2 + a{1,3},3
= γ({1, 2}) + γ({2, 3}) + γ({1, 3})
= 3,
which yields a contradiction.
Now we check C4 and P5. Let H be either C4 or P5. Suppose E(H) = {1, 2, 3, 4}, where i
and i + 1 are incident in H. Note that γ({1, 2, 3}) = γ({2, 3, 4}) = 2 and γ({1, 2}) = γ({2, 3}) =
γ({3, 4}) = 1. By efficiency and monotonicity, we have
4 = γ({1, 2, 3}) + γ({2, 3, 4})
= a{1,2,3},1 + a{1,2,3},2 + a{1,2,3},3 + a{2,3,4},2 + a{2,3,4},3 + a{2,3,4},4
≤ a{1,2},1 + a{1,2},2 + a{2,3},3 + a{2,3},2 + a{3,4},3 + a{3,4},4
= γ({1, 2}) + γ({2, 3}) + γ({3, 4})
= 3,
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which yields a contradiction.
The following lemma gives an alternative characterization for (K3, C4, P5)-free graphs.
Lemma 7. A graph G is (K3, C4, P5)-free if and only if each component of G is a tree of diameter
at most 3.
Proof. We first prove the “only if” part. Notice that a (K3, P5)-free graph does not contain any
odd cycle and that a (C4, P5)-free graph does not contain any even cycle. It follows that every
(K3, C4, P5)-free graph is a forest. Since any tree of diameter larger than 3 contains a P5, each
component of a (K3, C4, P5)-free graph is a tree of diameter at most 3.
Now we prove the “if” part. Let G be a graph whose components are trees of diameter at most 3.
Thus G is (K3, C4)-free. Since any graph of diameter at most 3 is P5-free, G is (K3, C4, P5)-free.
Figure 2: An example of stars. The dark
vertex is the center.
Figure 3: An example of pisceses. The dark vertices
are the bases and the dashed edge is a free rider.
Before proceeding, we introduce some notions for simplicity. A tree of diameter 2 is called a
star. The unique non-pendant vertex of a star is called the center (see Figure 2). Clearly, the
center of a star is a minimum vertex cover for the star. A K2 can also be viewed as a star but only
one endpoint can be viewed as the center. A tree of diameter 3 is called a pisces. A pisces can
be obtained from two stars by joining their centers with an edge. The two non-pendant vertices
in a pisces are called the bases which form a minimum vertex cover for the pisces. The unique
non-pendant edge in a pisces is called a free rider which has special significance for vertex cover
games (see Figure 3). To see this, consider the vertex cover game on a pisces. For any coalition
without the non-pendant edge, there is a minimum vertex cover which is a subset of the two bases.
Hence the non-pendent edge in a pisces can alway take a free ride and get covered by a minimum
vertex cover of other edges.
Let G = (V,E) be (K3, C4, P5)-free. Lemma 7 implies that every component of G is either a
star or a pisces. Let C∗ ⊆ V be the set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G. Then C∗ is a
minimum vertex cover of G. For any nonempty S ⊆ E, there is a minimum vertex cover C∗S ⊆ C∗ of
G[S], as every component of G[S] is either a star or a pisces. We will use these notations repeatedly
in the rest of this paper. Now we are ready to present one of our main results.
Theorem 1. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G. Then ΓG is population
monotonic if and only if G is (K3, C4, P5)-free.
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Proof. The “only if” part follows from Lemma 6. Now we prove the “if” part. Assume that G is
(K3, C4, P5)-free and ΓG is the vertex cover game on G. By Lemma 7, every component of G is
either a star or a pisces. Let C∗ be the set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G. For any
S ∈ 2N\{∅}, let C∗S ⊆ C∗ be a minimum vertex cover of G[S], and define the cost allocation by
aS,i =

0 if i is a free rider incident to other edges in S,
1 if i is a free rider not incident to other edges in S,
1
λS(i)
otherwise,
where λS(i) is the number of non-free rider edges in S incident to the vertex in C
∗
S that covers i.
The idea behind this allocation scheme is simple. For any S ∈ 2N\{∅}, split every vertex in C∗S
equally among non-free rider edges in S covered by the vertex, unless a free rider is the unique edge
in S covered by it. It remains to show that (aS,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is a PMAS for ΓG.
We first prove efficiency. Let S ∈ 2N\{∅}. By the construction, we have ∑i∈δS(v) aS,i = 1 for
any v ∈ C∗S . Further notice that free riders are the only possible edges incident to more than one
vertex in C∗S . Since aS,i = 0 for any free rider i that is incident to other edges in S, we have∑
i∈S
aS,i =
∑
v∈C∗S
∑
i∈δS(v)
aS,i = |C∗S | = γ(S).
We now check monotonicity. Let S, T ∈ 2N\{∅} with S ⊆ T and let i ∈ S. We distinguish two
cases of i. First assume that i is a free rider. We have 1 = aS,i ≥ aT,i ≥ 0 if i is not incident to
other edges in S and aS,i = aT,i = 0 otherwise. It follows that aS,i ≥ aT,i when i is a free rider.
Now assume that i is not a free rider. Since S ⊆ T , we have λS(i) ≤ λT (i), implying that
aS,i =
1
λS(i)
≥ 1
λT (i)
= aT,i.
Therefore, aS,i ≥ aT,i follows in either case.
Our proof for Theorem 1 is constructive, which provides a PMAS for every population monotonic
vertex cover game and motivates our subsequent work. The PMAS in our proof is based on a simple
principle: for every vertex in a special minimum vertex cover, share the cost equally among non-free
rider players covered by the vertex. By Lemma 7, every component of a (K3, C4, P5)-free graph has
at most two non-pendant vertices. Hence a (K3, C4, P5)-free graph can be recognized efficiently,
which implies that the population monotonicity of vertex cover games can be determined efficiently.
Corollary 2. The population monotonicity of vertex cover games can be determined in polynomial
time and a PMAS, if exists, can be constructed accordingly.
7
4 A dual-based description of PMAS-es with free riders
Let G = (V,E) be a graph and S ⊆ E be a nonempty edge set. Denote by LP (S) the following
linear program defined on G[S].
min
∑
v∈V
yv
LP (S): s.t. yu + yv≥ 1, ∀ iuv ∈ S, (1)
yv≥ 0, ∀ v ∈ VS . (2)
The incidence vector of any minimum vertex cover in G[S] is a feasible solution of LP (S). It
follows that τ(G[S]) is lower bounded by the optimum of LP (S). Ko¨nig Theorem states that the
gap between τ(G[S]) and the optimum of LP (S) is closed when G[S] is bipartite. Denote by DP (S)
the dual of LP (S). Hence τ(G[S]) equals the optimum of DP (S) when G[S] is bipartite.
max
∑
i∈S
xS,i
DP (S): s.t.
∑
i∈δS(v)
xS,i ≤ 1, ∀ v ∈ VS , (3)
xS,i ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ S. (4)
Further assume that G is (K3, C4, P5)-free. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on G. For
any S ∈ 2N\{∅}, γ(S) equals the optimum of DP (S). Moreover, we have the following observation
for PMAS-es of vertex cover games.
Lemma 8. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G and a be a PMAS for ΓG.
Then aS is an optimal solution of DP (S) for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Proof. We first prove that aS is feasible to DP (S). Since vertex cover games are monotonic, the
nonnegativity of aS follows from Lemma 1. It remains to show that
∑
i∈δS(v) aS,i ≤ 1 for any
v ∈ VS . Let v ∈ VS . Clearly, δS(v) ⊆ S. By efficiency and monotonicity, we have∑
i∈δS(v)
aS,i ≤
∑
i∈δS(v)
aδS(v),i = γ(δS(v)) = 1.
Hence aS is feasible to DP (S).
Now we prove that aS is optimal to DP (S). By efficiency, we have∑
i∈S
aS,i = γ(S).
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Theorem 1 implies that G[S] is (K3, C4, P5)-free, which is a special bipartite graph. Hence γ(S)
equals the optimum of DP (S), implying that aS is an optimal solution of DP (S).
Lemma 8 implies that for vertex cover games, allocations for each coalition in a PMAS are dual
optimal solutions of corresponding minimum vertex cover problem. In the following, we present a
more precise dual-based description for PMAS-es with free riders. Let C∗ be the set of centers of
stars and bases of pisceses in G and C∗S ⊆ C∗ be a minimum vertex cover of G[S]. Let pi(S) be the
linear system (3)-(4) and pi∗(S) be the linear system obtained from pi(S) by
– setting (3) to
∑
i∈δS(v) xS,i = 1 for any v ∈ C∗S , and
– setting (4) to xS,i = 0 for any free rider i incident to other edges in S.
Clearly, pi∗(S) ⊆ pi(S). Moreover, pi∗(S) is a subset of optimal solutions of DP (S).
Lemma 9. Let G = (V,E) be a (K3, C4, P5)-free graph. Then every vector in pi
∗(S) is an optimal
solutions of DP (S) for any nonempty S ⊆ E.
Proof. Let C∗ be the set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G and S ⊆ E be a nonempty
edge set. Let C∗S ⊆ C∗ be a minimum vertex cover of G[S] and xS ∈ pi∗(S). Since pi∗(S) ⊆ pi(S), we
have xS ∈ pi(S). It remains to prove the optimality of xS . Lemma 7 implies that every component
of G[S] is either a star or a pisces. Hence free riders in S are the only possible edges incident to
more than one vertex in C∗S . Since xS,i = 0 for any free rider i incident to other edges in S, it
follows that ∑
i∈S
xS,i =
∑
v∈C∗S
∑
i∈δS(v)
xS,i = |C∗S | = γ(S).
Therefore, xS is an optimal solution of DP (S).
Now we strengthen Lemma 8 and present a dual-based description of PMAS-es with free riders.
Theorem 3. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G and a be a PMAS for ΓG.
Then aS ∈ pi∗(S) for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Proof. Let a be a PMAS for ΓG. Theorem 1 and Lemma 7 imply that every component of G is
either a star or a pisces. Let C∗ be the set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G. Let
S ∈ 2N\{∅} and C∗S ⊆ C∗ be a minimum vertex cover of G[S]. Lemma 8 implies that aS is
an optimal solution of DP (S). Notice that any minimum vertex cover for a graph is a union of
minimum vertex covers for every component. Hence we assume that G[S] is connected. We show
that aS satisfies all equality constraints in pi
∗(S) by distinguishing three cases.
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Case 1: G[S] is a star without free riders. Let v∗ be the center of G[S]. Notice that δS(v∗) = S
and C∗S = {v∗}. By efficiency, we have∑
i∈δS(v∗)
aS,i =
∑
i∈S
aS,i = γ(S) = 1.
Case 2: G[S] is a pisces. Let i∗ be the free rider in S and v∗1, v∗2 be the endpoints of i∗. Hence
C∗S = {v∗1, v∗2}, δS(v∗1)∪ δS(v∗2) = S and δS(v∗1)∩ δS(v∗2) = {i∗}. By efficiency and monotonicity, we
have
2 = γ(S) =
∑
i∈S
aS,i
≤
∑
i∈δS(v∗1)
aδS(v∗1),i +
∑
i∈δS(v∗2)
aδS(v∗2),i − aδS(v∗k),i∗
= γ(δS(v
∗
1)) + γ(δS(v
∗
2))− aδS(v∗k),i∗
= 2− aδS(v∗k),i∗
for k = 1, 2. By monotonicity, we have
aS,i∗ = aδS(v∗k),i∗ = 0
and hence ∑
i∈δS(v∗k)
aS,i =
∑
i∈δS(v∗k)
aδS(v∗k),i = 1
for k = 1, 2.
Case 3: G[S] is a star with a free rider. Let v∗1 be the center of G[S]. Notice that δS(v∗1) = S
and C∗S = {v∗1}. Since G[S] contains a free rider, there exists T ⊆ N such that G[T ] is a pisces
and δS(v
∗
1) = δT (v
∗
1). Let i
∗ be the free rider in S ( T and v∗1, v∗2 be the endpoints of i∗. Let
C∗T = {v∗1, v∗2}. Clearly, C∗T ⊆ C∗ is a minimum vertex cover of G[T ]. By monotonicity, we have∑
i∈δS(v∗1)
aS,i =
∑
i∈δT (v∗1)
aT,i = 1
and hence
aS,i∗ = aT,i∗ = 0.
10
5 Integral PMAS-es and stable matchings
In this section, we first show that every integral PMAS for a vertex cover game ΓG is an extreme
point of P(ΓG), then use stable matchings to characterize integral PMAS-es for ΓG, and finally
conclude that integral PMAS-es for ΓG can be enumerated by employing Gale-Shapley algorithm.
Theorem 4. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(ΓG) 6= ∅. Then every
integral PMAS for ΓG is an extreme point of P(ΓG).
Proof. Let a be an integral PMAS for ΓG. Suppose a =
1
2b +
1
2c, where b, c ∈ P(ΓG). Let
S ∈ 2N\{∅}. It follows that aS = 12bS + 12cS . By Lemma 8, aS , bS and cS are all optimal solutions
of DP (S), implying that 0 ≤ aS,i ≤ 1, 0 ≤ bS,i ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ cS,i ≤ 1 for any i ∈ S. Since aS is
integral, we have aS,i = bS,i = cS,i for any i ∈ S. Therefore, a is an extreme point of P(ΓG).
Theorem 4 states that every integral PMAS for a vertex cover game ΓG is an extreme point of
P(ΓG). Unfortunately, not all extreme points of P(ΓG) are integral even when G is a star. Consider
the vertex cover game ΓK1,n = (N, γ) where n ≥ 4. Notice that γ(S) = 1 for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
Thus ΓK1,n falls into the scope of unit games investigated by Hamers et al. [7], where they showed
that P(ΓK1,n) has more than (n− 2) · n! non-integral extreme points. Hence for P(ΓG), instead of
all extreme points, we focus on integral extreme points.
Before proceeding, we introduce the notion of preference systems and stable matchings. Let
G = (V,E) be a graph. For any v ∈ V , let ≺v be a strict linear order on edges in δ(v). We call
≺v the preference of v. For any i, j ∈ δ(v), we say that i dominates j (at v) if i ≺v j. We use ≺
to denote the set of preferences ≺v for any v ∈ V , and call the ordered pair (G,≺) a preference
system. In particular, (G,≺) is bipartite if G is bipartite. A stable matching in (G,≺) is a matching
M of G such that every edge in E\M is dominated by an edge in M . For any S ⊆ E, we use ≺S
to denote the restriction of ≺ to S, and hence (G[S],≺S) is also a preference system. Gale and
Shapley [4] proved that every bipartite preference system admits a stable matching by providing
an efficient algorithm, namely Gale-Shapley algorithm, for computing stable matchings. Now we
are ready to characterize integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games with stable matchings.
Theorem 5. Let ΓG = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(ΓG) 6= ∅. Then the
following statements are equivalent.
(i) a is an integral PMAS for ΓG.
(ii) There is a preference system (G,≺), where every free rider has the lowest rank, such that aS
is the incidence vector of a stable matching in (G[S],≺S) for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
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Proof. Theorem 1 and Lemma 7 imply that every component of G is either a star or a pisces.
(i)⇒ (ii). Let a be an integral PMAS for ΓG. We first define a preference system (G,≺) from
a. Let C∗ be the set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G. To define a preference system
(G,≺), it suffices to define a preference ≺v for any v ∈ C∗. Let v∗ be a vertex in C∗. For any
nonempty set S ⊆ δ(v∗), we have ∑i∈S aS,i = γ(S) = 1. We define a preference ≺v∗ for v∗ from a
as follows. Start with S = δ(v∗). Let i∗ ∈ S be the edge with aS,i∗ = 1. Define partial orders of
≺v∗ by
i∗ ≺v∗ j, ∀ j ∈ S\{i∗}.
Update S with S\{i∗} and repeat the process above until S = ∅. We claim that when S becomes
empty, ≺v∗ is a well-defined strict linear order on δ(v∗). Indeed, consider any two edges i, j in δ(v∗).
Clearly, G[{i, j}] is a star. Since a{i,j},i + a{i,j},j = γ({i, j}) = 1, we may assume that a{i,j},i = 1
and a{i,j},j = 0. For any S ⊆ N with {i, j} ⊆ S, the monotonicity implies that aS,j = a{i,j},j = 0.
Hence i ≺v∗ j always holds. Thus a determines a unique preference system (G,≺).
Now we show that every free rider in (G,≺) has the lowest rank in any preference. Let i∗ be a
free rider in G and v∗1, v∗2 be the endpoints of i∗. Clearly, v∗1, v∗2 ∈ C∗. By Theorem 3, aS,i∗ = 0 for
any S containing other edges incident to i∗. Thus i∗ has the lowest rank in both ≺v∗1 and ≺v∗2 .
Therefore, a defines a unique preference system (G,≺) where every free rider has the lowest
rank. Since every component of G is either a star or a pisces, it is easy to see that (G[S],≺S) has
a unique stable matching MS with incidence vector aS for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}.
(ii)⇒ (i). Let (G,≺) be a preference system where every free rider has the lowest rank. Since
every component of G is either a star or a pisces, (G[S],≺S) has a unique stable matching MS
for any S ∈ 2N\{∅}. We show that a = (aS,i)S∈2N\{∅},i∈S is an integral PMAS for ΓG, where
aS = (aS,i)i∈S is the incidence vector of MS .
We first check efficiency. Let S ∈ 2N\{∅} and MS be the unique stable matching of (G[S],≺S).
Since every free rider has the lowest rank in any preference, MS is also a maximum matching of
G[S]. Then we have ∑
i∈S
aS,i = |MS | = ν(G[S]) = τ(G[S]) = γ(S).
Hence the efficiency follows.
We now prove monotonicity. Let S, T ∈ 2N\{∅} with S ⊆ T . Let MS and MT be the unique
stable matching of (G[S],≺S) and (G[T ],≺T ), respectively. Let i ∈ S. If i ∈ MT , then we have
i ∈MS , implying that
aS,i = aT,i = 1.
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Otherwise, we have
aS,i ≥ aT,i = 0.
In either case we have aS,i ≥ aT,i. Hence the monotonicity follows.
Theorem 5 reveals the principle behind integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games: the new player
always takes the full cost of the vertex covering it in a minimum vertex cover. More specifically,
consider the following coalition growing process. The coalition starts with an empty set. A new
player joins the coalition by deciding whether or not to connect to a vertex in the current coalition.
But every new player is only allowed to connect to a vertex of an existing minimum vertex cover
or a pendant vertex of an existing star in the current coalition. However, the new player always
has to pay for the full cost of the vertex covering it, no matter whether or not the vertex belongs
to a minimum vertex cover for the coalition before the new player joins. Theorem 5 also suggests
that for vertex cover games, there is a one-to-one correspondence between integral PMAS-es and
preference systems such that every free rider has the lowest rank. Since such preference system
defined on a (K3, C4, P5)-free graph has a unique stable matching, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 6. Integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games can be enumerated by employing Gale-
Shapely algorithm.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper investigates PMAS-es for vertex cover games. We show that the population monotonic-
ity can be determined in polynomial time and a PMAS, if exists, can be constructed accordingly.
We also show that integral PMAS-es can be characterized with stable matchings and be enumer-
ated by employing Gale-Shapley algorithm. However, neither computing a PMAS nor determining
whether a given vector is a PMAS can be done efficiently, as both problems have exponential
size. Nevertheless, integral allocations for each coalition in a PMAS can be computed efficiently by
Gale-Shapley algorithm.
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